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HOME RULE: A FRESH START
In November of 1963, the people of New York State adopted an amendment to article IX of the state constitution. Through this amendment and additional implementing legislation,1 a new home rule package was provided to
redistribute some of the state governmental functions. Past provisions were
adapted to changed conditions to provide a framework for the future development of more effective, local government. With these purposes in mind, this
comment will attempt to analyze and discuss the new provisions, some of the
grants of power and probable limitations.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

Home rule may be described as the desire for local autonomy in local
matters. The object of home rule is to prevent legislative interference in local
government, to permit local self-government and to provide adequate powers for
the successful achievement of self-government. It is possible to trace its origins
to the Magna Carta,2 and certainly to find its advocates in early American
history.3
The development of home rule in New York State may be studied in terms
of the opposition it has met and, to some extent, overcome. 4 Its two primary
opponents have been the legislative and judicial branches of the state government. In its early development, home rule conflicted with the legislative predilection to check or control local units. This attitude stemmed from doubts
concerning the ability of local units to solve their problems adequately. Furthermore, local governments were regarded as overly susceptible to political pressures
1. The new amendment requires the passage of a Statute of Local Governments,
". granting to local governments powers including but not limited to those of local
legislation and administration in addition to the powers vested in them by this article."
N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 2(b) (1) as amended (Supp. 1964). The Statute of Local Governments
was enacted, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 205, and will take effect on July 1, 1965. In
addition, the legislature has passed the Municipal Home Rule Law to implement the
provisions of the new amendment. See New York State Office for Local Government,
Analysis of the Municipal Home Rule Law, 35C N.Y. Consol. Laws XI (McKinney (Pamph.)
1964).
2. See People ex rel. Met. St. Ry. v. Tax Comm'r, 174 N.Y. 417, 431-32, 67 N.E. 69,
70-71 (1903), aff'd, 199 U.S. 1 (1905); Magna Carta art. 13. See generally Blair, American
Local Government 21-26 (1964); Weiner, Municipal Home Rule In New York, 37 Colum.
L. Rev. 557 (1937). For an historical discussion of earlier forms of local government,
See 1 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations 23 (3d ed. 1949).
3. See, e.g., Blair, op. cit. supra note 2, at 21-26; Maddox, Fuquay, State And Local
Government 1-11, 40-42 (1962); 1 McQuillin, op. cit. supra note 2, at 281-333; Richland,
Constitutional City Hoine Rule In New York, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 311, 315-20 (1954);
Weiner, op. cit. supra note 2, at 557-61. "[M]unicipal institutions constitute the strength
of free nations. Town meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to science, they
bring it within the people's reach. ...A nation may establish a free government, but without
municipal institutions it cannot have the spirit of liberty." 1 de Tocqueville, Democracy In
America 61 (Bradley ed. 1953).
4. Richland, supra note 3, at 315-16.
5. Ibid. At various times, the executive branch has aided the cause of home rule by
vetoing various special laws. "In many such instances the Governors even vetoed legislation relating to matters which have since become recognized as . . . 'matters of state
concern.'" Id. at 319.
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which were not always consonant with the best interests of the people of the
area. Another less publicized reason was the legislature's desire for political
control.8 By concentrating control of local governmental units in the state
legislature, the dominant political party could affect or even control local
politics. Related to the political purpose was and is the conflict which one
commentator has called New York City versus the rest of the state.7 The dichotomy of interests is expressed by rural opposition to granting New York City,
or any other large municipality, the powers felt to be so essential to its government. During most of this evolutionary period of home rule, the rural areas
supported the dominant political party, while New York City was primarily
affiliated with the minority party.
Although earlier measures had been adopted to check legislative action
adversely affecting local units,8 the first weapon in the home rule "arsenal"
did not appear until 1894.9 At the state constitutional convention that year,
cities were provided with protection against special legislation by means of
the suspensive veto. The amendment provided that laws relating to the property, affairs or government of cities be divided into general and special laws.
Special city laws were those which applied to only one city or to less than all
in a class. The amendment further required that such a special law be submitted, prior to its passage, to the mayor of the affected city for his approval
or veto.' 0 Though limited, a mayor's veto of proposed legislation did provide
some protection against adverse legislative encroachments.:" At this time, the
judiciary came forward to protect the legislature's powers from any local
limitation.
Cases arose in which various state laws were challenged as special laws
which would have been subject to the suspensive veto and to re-passage by a
6. Id. at 316.
7. Richland, Property, Affairs and Government 35, 45 (Proceedings-Municipal Law
Seminar, New York State Office for Local Gov't, 1963) [hereinafter cited as 1963
Municipal Law Seminar].
8. N.Y. Const. art. XXIX (1777) (election of officers); N.Y. Const. art. IV, § 8
(1821) (election of officers); N.Y. Const. art. III, § 20 (1821) (required two-thirds vote
of the legislature to appropriate local funds or property) ; N.Y. Const. art. III, § 16 (1846)
(limited the legislature's power to pass local or private bills); N.Y. Const. art. III, § 18
(1874) (legislature was prohibited from passing special laws on enumerated subjects). See
1 Lincoln, Constitutional History of New York 180, 205-06, 241, 299-301 (1906); XI New
York State Constitutional Convention Committee, Problems Relating To Home Rule And
Local Government 20-21 (1938) [hereinafter cited as XI Constitutional Convention
Report). For a discussion of legislative abuses in New York State, see McBain, Law and
Practice of Municipal Home Rule 5-12 (1916).
9. N.Y. Const. art. XII, § 2 (1894). See 4 Lincoln, op. cit. supra note 8, at 777-86;
McBain, op. cit. supra note 8, at 101-06; Richland, Constitutional City Home Ride In
New York, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 311, 320-23 (1954).
10. Under this amendment, a bill could be disapproved or vetoed by the mayor and
returned within 15 days or merely vetoed by his failure to return the bill within 15 days.
In either case, the legislature could override the veto by repassage of the bill with the regular
majority vote. N.Y. Const. art. XII, § 2 (1894).
11. Though a mayor's veto could be overridden by repassage, that rarely occurred.
"[S]uch bills were passed during the busy concluding days of legislative sessions and
repassage under such circumstances was unlikely.' Lazarus, Constitutional Amendment and
Home Rule lt New York State, 14 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 14, 1964, p. 4, col. 4.
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majority vote of the legislature if vetoed. The courts evaded these requirements
by finding that such laws were of general application and not subject to restriction as special laws.12 Another method used to avoid the special law restriction was to find that the laws dealt with matters, such as health, which were
within the scope of the state's police power. In that case, ". . . the legislature
is not hampered or restrained by the classification of cities in the constitution.
It may adjust details to meet varying conditions."'13 While the courts continued
in their restrictive interpretations of the meaning of special law, the legislature
began to change its attitude toward local governments. Many special laws
which would have certainly been upheld as general laws by the court, were
submitted to the local units for approval. 14
When the home rule amendment of 1923 was adopted, it seemed to provide
very generous home rule protection. This amendment defined special laws as
those which were special in terms or effect, 1 thus eliminating the judicial fiction
that a law is a general law merely because it is not aimed at a specific city.
Special laws could be enacted upon request of the governor, with a two-thirds
vote of the legislature required for passage.16 The amendment also granted
positive powers to cities, ". . . to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent
with the constitution and laws of the state, relating to . . ." nine specific
17
subjects.
Secure in its new powers, New York City passed a local law to acquire
a bus system for the city.'8 The city's power to enact such a local law was
attacked and the Court of Appeals upheld the challenge.' 9 In its decision, the
Court noted that cities were given legislative power in nine specified categories
12. Matter of McAneny v. Board of Estimate, 232 N.Y. 377, 134 N.E. 187 (1922)
(Rapid Transit law); Brooklyn City R.R. v. Whalen, 229 N.Y. 570, 128 N.E. 215, affirming 191 App. Div. 737, 182 N.Y. Supp. 283 (2d Dep't 1920) (bus system); Vroman
v. Fish, 223 N.Y. 540, 119 N.E. 1084, affirming 181 App. Div. 502, 170 N.Y. Supp. 421 (4th
Dep't 1918) (election law); Admiral Realty Co. v. City of New York, 206 N.Y. 110, 99
N.E. 241 (1912) (rapid transit system); McGrath v. Grout, 171 N.Y. 7, 63 N.E. 547
(1902) (sheriff's salary); Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n v. Mayor, 152 N.Y. 257, 46
N.E. 499 (1897) (rapid transit system); Kingsbridge Ry. v. City of New York, 204 App.
Div. 369, 198 N.Y. Supp. 135 (1st Dep't 1923) (bus system); Schafer v. City of New
York, 206 App. Div. 747, 200 N.Y. Supp. 947 (1st Dep't 1923) (bus system); Huff v.
City of New York, 202 App. Div. 425, 195 N.Y. Supp. 257 (2d Dep't 1922) (bus system);
People ex rel. Hobach v. Sheriff, 13 Misc. 587, 35 N.Y. Supp. 19 (Sup. Ct. 1895) (regulation
of barbers). But see Matter of Elm Street, 246 N.Y. 72, 75-76, 158 N.E. 24, 25 (1927);
cf. N.Y. Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 263 (1921).
13. People ex rel. Einsfield v. Murray, 149 N.Y. 367, 44 N.E. 146 (1896).
14. Richland, Constitutional City Home Rule In New York, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 311,
325-26 (1954).
15. N.Y. Const. art. XII, § 2 (1894) (amended 1923).
16. N.Y. Const. art. XII, § 3.
17. N.Y. Const. art. XII, § 3. The enumerated subjects are: matters relating to the
officers and employees of a city, the transaction of its business, incurring obligations,
matters relating to claims against a city, the hours of work and safety of employees of its
contractors and subcontractors, matters relating to city streets and property, regulating
the conduct of its inhabitants, and the protection of the property, safety and health of its
inhabitants.
18. N.Y. City Local Laws 1925, Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6.
19. Browne v. City of New York, 241 N.Y. 96, 149 N.E. 211 (1925).

486

COMMENTS
and not general powers over their property, affairs or government. 20 The acquisition of a bus system was not one of the enumerated subjects and therefore
was not considered a part of the general, police power grant. This decision
pointed out a serious omission in the amendment which created a legislative
no-man's land. The state could not legislate in the area of a particular city's
property, affairs or government except on a governor's request with a two-thirds
vote; otherwise it would have been an unconstitutional special law. A city
could not enact laws upon a subject unless it was within one of the specified categories. 2 1 This omission was cured in 1928 with the amendment of the City
Home Rule Law. That statute granted cities the power to legislate in relation
to their property, affairs or government as well as on the nine subjects specified
in the constitution.2
The following year, a divided Court of Appeals handed down the landmark home rule decision, Adler v. Deegan.23 A state multiple dwelling law was
attacked as being unconstitutional as a special law in effect, since it applied
only to cities with over 800,000 population. The law was intended to eliminate
insanitary housing conditions in New York City tenements and was sorely
needed. In upholding the law by finding that it was not within the restricted
class of special laws, the majority opinion relied on pre-amendment (1923)
cases construing the phrase "property, affairs or government." Apparently contravening the intent of the drafters of the amendment, the Court said that
the old case law defining property, affairs or government should be carried forward and used in construing the amendment. Implicitly rejecting a rule of
constitutional interpretation, 24 the Court said, "When the people put these
words in . . . the Constitution, they put them there with a Court of Appeals'
definition, not that of Webster's dictionary. ' 25 The decision was also based on
the doctrine of state concern. According to this theory, the state's power was
not to be restricted if the subject was of substantial state concern. No attempt
was made to clarify that phrase but it was generally applied to cover subjects
20. Id. at 119-20, 149 N.E. at 218.
21. It has been suggested that this legislative void was the cause of the courts
allowing many special laws to pass as general laws. They desired to have some legislative
body fill the void. Richland, Constitutional City Home Rule In New York, 54 Colum. L.
Rev. 311, 328 (1954).
22. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1928, ch. 670.
23. 251 N.Y. 467, 167 N.E. 705 (1929), 39 Yale L.J. 92.
24. "In construing the language of the Constitution . . . the courts should look for
the intention of the people and give to the language used its ordinary meaning." In re
Sherill, 188 N.Y. 185, 207, 81 N.E. 124, 131 (1907). See 2 N.Y. Consol. Laws, Rules of
Interpretation 13-14 (McKinney 1954); 8 N.Y. Jur. Constitutional Law § 22 (1964).
25. 251 N.Y. 467, 473, 167 N.E. 705, 707 (1929). But see Kuhn v. Curran, 294 N.Y.
207, 217, 61 N.E.2d 513, 517-18 (1945). In that case the court said, "It is the approval of
the People of the State which gives force to a provision of the Constitution . . . and in
construing the Constitution we seek the meaning which the words would convey to an
intelligent, careful voter." Compare Asch, Municipal Home Rule In New York, 20 Brooklyn
L. Rev. 201, 212 (1954) with Richland, Constitutional City Home Rule In New York, 54
Colum. L. Rev. 311, 330-31 (1954). See Lazarus, op. cit. supra note 11, Oct. 15, 1964,
p. 1, cols. 4-5.
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usually included within the state's police power. 26 Judge Cardozo's concurring
opinion in the Adler case indicated that local legislative action may be permitted
in areas of mutual concern not dealt with by the state. However, once the state
2
had legislated, local action was limited to some supplemental legislation. 7
Though unable to define with precision the scope of local property, affairs or
government, or to provide an adequate test for state concern, the Court was
certain the multiple dwelling law was constitutional. As has been suggested,
it seems that the great necessity for such a law coupled with the absence of
support to achieve a two-thirds vote in the state legislature influenced the decision. 28 The decision in Adler v. Deegan has, nevertheless, proved to be the source
of home rule principles and of confusion in their interpretation.
A thorough study was made in anticipation of major changes in the home
rule provisions at the Constitutional Convention in 1938.29 Although most of
the proposed changes in the committee report were not drastic, the proposed
restriction of the state's power to act in matters of state concern, caused prolonged debate.2 0 Confusion arose as to the exact effect of the limitation. Some
believed that the state's police powers were limited by the prohibition of special laws. Others believed that the prohibition applied to special laws affecting
the city in its identity as a governing body.2 1 "Not a member of the committee,
nor, indeed, the convention came to the defense of the expanded home rule
which the Committee bill provided. '32 After the bill was amended to allow
state legislation for local units in matters not related to their property, affairs
or government, the convention adopted it. The convention did provide a change
in the emergency request procedure for special laws which required that the
request come from the local unit and not from the governor.2 3 Another significant change was the fact that the general, legislative powers of cities over
matters relating to their property, affairs or government was granted in the
constitution for the first time.34 These general powers were previously granted
in the City Home Rule Law and were subject to legislative restriction or elimination. The drafters assumed that the previously restrictive judicial interpretations would not continue, and that this would be an extensive grant of local
26. The doctrine of state concern was enunciated as dictum in City of New York v.
Village of Lawrence, 250 N.Y. 429, 443, 165 N.E. 836, 840 (1929). The court relied on the
McGrath, Admiral and McAneny cases cited at note 8 supra.
27. Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 491, 167 N.E. 705, 714 (1929) (Cardozo, J.,
concurring).
28. Richland, Constitutional City Home Rule In New York, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 311,
329-30 (1954).
29. XI Constitutional Convention Report.
30. Richland, Constitutional City Home Rule In New York: II, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 598,
600-03 (1955).
31. Id. at 600-02.
32. Id. at 602.
33. N.Y. Const. art. IX. § 11 (1938) (subsequently amended).
34. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 12. This section also provided that cities, ". . . may repeal,
supersede or modify any law which was enacted upon and which required . . . a message
from the governor ... insofar as such law relates to the property, affairs or government of
such city. .....
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power. Although these changes were effected, it was clear that no one at the
convention desired to change the state concern doctrine so as to limit the
state's police powersY5 Since then, home rule has continued to gain support in
the legislature but it has also continued to suffer at the hands of the judiciary.
Two major problems remain to plague home rule advocates in New York
State. First, there is confusion in determining the scope of the phrase "local
property, affairs and government." Secondly, state concern has remained a tenuous, constantly changing doctrine causing uncertainty on the part of local governments. The lack of local action in coping with most local problems; the
restrictive judicial interpretations of local powers; the distrust and stiffing
paternalism of the state legislature, are each a result of our inability to apportion clearly the governmental function between state and local governments.
Though subsequent cases have indicated some of the subjects to be included in
local legislative power, 36 and those retained by the state,37 this has not been
an adequate solution. The new home rule amendment has provided a solution.
Its effectiveness will depend on the efforts and understanding of local governments, the courts and the legislature.
35. Richland, Constitutional City Home Rule It New York: II, 55 Colum. L. Rev.
598, 605-06 n.132 (1955).
36. See, e.g., McMillen v. Browne, 14 N.Y.2d 326, 200 N.E.2d 546, 251 N.Y.S.2d 641
(1964) (minimum wage stipulation in city contracts); Baldwin v. Buffalo, 6 N.Y.2d 168,
160 N.E.2d 443, 189 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1959) (fixing ward boundaries); Gorman v. City,
304 N.Y. 865, 109 N.E.2d 881 (1952) (non-contractual aspects of pension plan); F.T.B.
Realty Corp. v. Goodman, 300 N.Y. 140, 89 N.E.2d 865 (1949) (by implication) (rent
control); People v. Lewis, 295 N.Y. 42, 64 N.E.2d 702 (1945) (price control); Allmendinger
v. City, 295 N.Y. 644, 64 N.E.2d 712 (1945) (hours and wages of city employees); Holland
v. Bankson, 290 N.Y. 267, 49 N.E.2d 16 (1943) (city employees); Johnson v. Etkin, 279
N.Y. 1, 17 N.E.2d 401 (1938) (selecting local officers); Osborn v. Cohen, 272 N.Y. 55, 4
N.E.2d 289 (1936) (fire dept.); Molnar v. Curtin, 273 App. Div. 322, 77 N.Y.S.2d 553
(1st Dep't 1948) (price regulation); P. & A. Carting Co. v. O'Connell, 7 Misc. 2d 815, 158
N.Y.S.2d 296 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (cartmen regulation); Pomeranz v. City of New York, 1
Misc. 2d 486, 151 N.Y.S.2d 789 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (parking lot regulation); City of New
Rochelle v. Seacord, 30 N.Y.S.2d 240 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (selecting officers).
37. See, e.g., Wholesale Laundry Bd. of Trade Inc. v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d
998, 189 N.E.2d 623, 239 N.Y.S.2d 128, affirming 17 A.D.2d 327, 234 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1st
Dep't 1962) (minimum wage law); Whalen v. Wagner, 4 N.Y.2d 575, 152 N.E.2d 54,
176 N.Y.S.2d 616 (1958) (local and interstate bridges); 749 Broadway v. Boy]and,
3 N.Y.2d 737, 143 N.E.2d 519, 163 N.Y.S.2d 973 (1957), affirming 1 A.D.2d 819,
148 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1st Dep't 1956) (court procedure and taxes); Salzman v. Impellitteri,
305 N.Y. 414, 113 N.E.2d 543 (1953) (taxes and transportation system); F.T.B. Corp. v.
Goodman, 300 N.Y. 140, 89 N.E.2d 865 (1949) (court procedure); Tartaglia v. McLaughlin, 297 N.Y. 419, 79 N.E.2d 809, reversing 273 App. Div. 821, 76 N.Y.S.2d
305 (2d Dep't 1948) (court procedure); People ex rel. Elkind v. Rosenblum, 295 N.Y.
929, 68 N.E.2d 34 (1946) (education); Good Humor Corp. v. City of New York, 290 N.Y.
312, 49 N.E.2d 153 (1943) (regulation of streets and peddlers); County Securities v.
Seacord, 278 N.Y. 34, 15 N.E.2d 179 (1938) (taxes); Robertson v. Zimmermann, 268 N.Y.
52, 196 N.E. 740 (1935) (local sewer system); Board of Supervisors v. Water Power &
Control Comm'n, 255 N.Y. 531, 175 N.E. 300, affirming 227 App. Div. 345, 238 N.Y.S. 55
(3d Dep't 1929) (New York City water supply); Ainslee v. Lounsberry, 275 App. Div.
729, 86 N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d Dep't 1949) (licensing plumbers); Aldrich v. City of New York,
208 Misc. 930, 145 N.Y.S.2d 732 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (city park land); Kaney v. State
Civil Service, 190 Misc. 944, 77 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (civil service system);
Kelly-Sullivan Inc. v. Moss, 174 Misc. 1098, 22 N.Y.S.2d 491 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd, 260 App.
Div. 921, 24 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1st Dep't 1940) and 180 Misc. 3, 39 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Sup. Ct. 1943)
(theater tickets); Erikson v. City, 167 Misc. 42, 2 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Sup. Ct. 1937)
(education). See generally 13 Buffalo L. Rev. 149 (1963).
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MANDATE

FOR A LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION

Some of the provisions in the new amendment are redeclarations of past
provisions which have been well established.2 8 Given traditional canons of interpretation,39 these provisions will convey the same grants of power to and limitations upon local units and will probably receive similar judicial interpretation.
However, imbedded in these same canons of interpretation is the principle that
the use of different language or language of qualification, indicates an intention
to change the former provisions. 40 Under this principle, past interpretations must
be abandoned and the courts should treat the redeclaration as a wholly new
provision. With this in mind I would like to deal with a major change and
qualification and discuss its effects.
Dillon's Rule
One of the most significant changes in article IX is the articulated change
in policy or legislative intent as so ratified by the people. This change is evidenced by the abrogation of an old restrictive rule for construing home rule
powers, Dillon's rule. 41 That rule provided that local governments are creatures
or agencies of the state, 42 that they derive all of their powers from the state
and that those powers should be narrowly construed against the local units.
The amendment explicitly repudiates the Dillon rule by requiring that, "Rights,
powers, privileges and immunities granted to local governments by this article
should be liberally construed." 48 In addition, there is an implicit repudiation
of the restrictive rule in the statement of purpose, 44 and in the choice of the
38. It has been suggested that most of the provisions of the new amendment are
merely redeclarations of past statutory, constitutional and case law provisions on home
rule. For a table showing the derivation of many of the new provisions, see Grad, The
New York Home Rule Amendment-A Bill of Rights for Local Government?, 14 A.B.A.
Local Government Service Letter No. 6, p. 6 (June 1964).
39. It has generally been held that if a new amendment re-enacts a former provision
of a constitution in the same words, it is presumed that the purpose was to continue the
former provisions in uninterrupted operation. See, e.g., Allison v. Welde, 172 N.Y. 421, 431,
65 N.E. 263, 266 (1902); 2 N.Y. Consol. Laws, Rules of Interpretation 15 & n.63 (McKinney
1954).
40. "Where in a new constitution, an article relating to the same subject matter
embraced in . . . the former constitution which has received judicial construction, is
phrased in different language or qualified, it is presumed that the effect of the construction
placed upon the former provision is intended to be avoided." Franklin Nat'l Bank of Long
Island v. Clark, 26 Misc. 2d 724, 733, 212 N.Y.S.2d 942, 954 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (emphasis
added). See Matter of Smith, 90 Hun 568, 36 N.Y. Supp. 40 (1895) ; 2 McKinney, op. ci.
supra note 39, at 16 & n.64.
41. 1 Dillon, Commentaries on The Law of Municipal Corporations § 237 (5th ed.
1911); 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations 620-27 (3d ed. 1949).
42. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339, 342 (1960); Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933); City of
Trenton v. State of New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923); City of New York v. Maltbie, 274
N.Y. 90, 8 N.E.2d 289 (1937); Tierney v. Cohen, 268 N.Y. 464, 198 N.E. 225 (1935);
Matter of McAneny v. Bd. of Estimate, 232 N.Y. 377, 134 N.E. 187 (1922); 2 McQuillin,
op. cit. supra note 41, 13-19 & n.40. For a discussion of the inapplicability of federal constitutional guarantees against state action on state-local relations, see 1 Antieau, Municipal
Corporation Law 57-66 (1964).
43. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 3(c) (1938) as amended (Supp. 1964).
44. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 1.
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title Bill of Rights for Local Governments. In keeping with the intent of the
drafters,45 it is submitted that the title Bill of Rights for Local Governments
indicates a desire to adopt all of the protection and legal reverence surrounding
the Bill of Rights of our federal constitution. Little else remained to be done
by the drafters to indicate their intent to all who would interpret the article.
Continued restrictive interpretations of powers and immunities granted by the
amendment would clearly contravene its purpose.
State Concern
The doctrine of state concern was articulated by courts anxious to protect
the state legislature from limitation. As noted above, there was no clear intent
46
to eliminate this doctrine if it meant restricting the state's police power. In
its application, state concern was the product of judicial recognition and confusion of three aspects of the governmental function. The primary function of
state government is to guarantee the orderly development and conduct of society
on both the state and local levels. Included within this primary function are
two subsidiary functions which should be distinguished. First, the state must
provide the state-wide necessities, i.e., those laws and services needed by the
state as a whole. Secondly, the state must provide local necessities, i.e., the laws
and services needed by each individual local unit. Thus the three aspects of
the state's function may be listed as:
I.

Guarantorof an ordered society
A. Provider of state-wide necessities.
B. Provider of local necessities.

As state government developed, most of the responsibility for local necessities was shifted to the local units as state agencies. Gradually, efficiency, local
pride and traditional desires for local self-government developed. That desire
grew into the belief that the state's powers in local matters should be limited
to that of a guarantor. In this system, the state guarantees the inhabitants of
each local unit that their local government will do its job, while the state provides the state-wide necessities. However, that desire was never fully articulated
45. The author has drawn considerably from statements made by members of the
New York State Office for Local Government as recorded in the Proceeding-Municipal
Law Seminar for 1963 and 1964. Since that office was involved in drafting the new amendment as well as the Municipal Home Rule Law and Statute of Local Governments, statements of purpose and interpretation made by these members are useful in construing the
new provisions. See, e.g., Moore, The Constitutional Amendment 10 (1963 Municipal Law
Seminar); Fleischman, Grants of Local Powers 24 (1963 Municipal Law Seminar);
Fleischman, Expanded Powers For Municipal Self-Government 16 (Proceedings-Municipal
Law Seminar, 1964, New York State Office For Local Govenment), [hereinafter cited as
1964 Municipal Law Seminar]: Temporary Commission On Revision and Simplification

of the Constitution, First Steps Toward A Modern Constitution 14-17 (Legis. Doc. No. 58)
(1959); Temporary State Commission On the Constitutional Convention, Second Interim
Report 14-16 (N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 57) (1957).

46. Richland, Constitutional City Home Rule In New York: 11, 55 Colum. L. Rev.

598, 600-06 (1955).
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or enacted in a constitution. Courts approached problems involving the allocation
of functions with uncertainty and often confused each aspect of the governmental function. 47 Anxious to prevent the development of city-states and the
encroachments on state power, and, finding no clear mandate for greater local
48
autonomy, the courts retained the older restrictive approach.
It is suggested that the new amendment now provides a clear mandate for
the new and more liberal delegation approach. Courts are no longer to be overprotective of the state's powers in local matters, in fact the courts' concern
should shift to the local units.49 Provisions in the amendment indicate that
some of the state's power to provide state-wide necessities can be clearly delegated. 50 Again, this is not to say that the state is limited in state-wide matters
or even that it has lost all control of local matters. It seems clear that where a
crisis or emergency condition has arisen affecting the welfare of a community,
the state may step in to correct local ineptitude or inaction. Short of such compelling circumstances, the state might intervene to correct a manifest or potentially dangerous disregard of local public interests. But where local government
operates responsibly and competently, the doctrine of state concern should not
be raised as a bar to the local exercise of delegated functions.
Pre-emption

Pre-emption is a related doctrine by which the legislature prohibits local
legislation on a subject by completely occupying the field with general laws
47. As used by the Court, the doctrine of state concern has usually been an extension
of the state's police powers. A common tactic of courts has been to generalize the subject
matter to such an extent that it involved some aspect of the police power. Once generalized,
there was no possible limitation. "The police power of the State has never been questioned
when it dealt directly with hygienic conditions of a community." Ainslee v. Lounsberry,
275 App. Div. 729, 729-30, 86 N.Y.S.2d 857, 858 (3d Dep't 1949). See Adler v. Deegan,
251 N.Y. 467, 478, 484, 167 N.E. 705, 709, 711 (1929). The courts have confused the
state's responsibility for assuring that something is done with the duty to do it itself.
Using precedents, traditional respect for the police power and the confusion in allocating
various functions between state and local governments, the courts have succeeded in
expanding the doctrine of state concern. "If any one thing, however, has been settled ...
it is the state-wide extension of the interest in the maintenance of life and health. The
advancement of that interest . ..is a function of the state at large." Adler v. Deegan,
supra at 485, 167 N.E. at 711 (concurring-opinion). See generally Lazarus, op. cit. supra
note 11, Oct. 14, 1964, p. 1, cols. 4-5; Mendelson, Paths to Constitutional Home Rule For
Municipalities,6 Vand. L. Rev. 66, 77 (1952).
48. The test usually provided is one of the depth of interest. "The test is . ..that
if the subject be in a substantial degree a matter of state concern, the legislature may act,
though intermingled with it are concerns of the locality." Adler v. Deegan, supra note 47,
at 491, 167 N.E. at 714 (Cardozo, J., concurring). But see the dissenting opinion of Judge
O'Brien supra at 501, 167 N.E. at 717. See cases cited note 37 supra.
49. "Furthermore, the new Home Rule Amendment provides for a liberal interpretation
of the rights, powers, privileges and immunities granted to local governments.... Here there
now is a constitutional injunction directed to the courts to construe in favor of local government. . . ." Address by Milton Alpert, Conference of Mayors in New York City, June 15,
1964. See, e.g., Richland, Property, Affairs And Government 44 (1963 Municipal Law Seminar); Fleischman, Expanded Powers ForMunicipal Self-Government 15-16 (1964 Municipal
Law Seminar).
50. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 1(c), (h) (1938) as amended (Supp. 1964); N.Y. Municipal
Home Rule Law § 33(3) (c). This provides for authorized transfer of functions between
counties and cities. But see N.Y. Statute of Local Governments § 11(3).
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or by indicating an intent to do so.51 Limitations on the power of pre-emption
2
are inherent in the various subjects or self-imposed by the legislature. 5 Under
affecting
laws
former constitutional provisions, the state could enact general
53
the property, affairs or government of local units. Although the new amend-

ment still permits general laws relating to local property, affairs and government, 4 the new construction clause indicates an intent to limit that power.
The effect of the construction clause is to grant local units control over local
necessities as long as they fulfill their obligation to provide them. State
power should be introduced in this area only when the local units fail to act.
Pre-emption is still available, but it is relegated to state-wide necessities and to
curing local failures. Furthermore, the courts are again asked to shift their
protective concern to the local units, to insure that attempts at pre-emption are
clearly necessary and not instituted to usurp local power. No specific rule or
formula for apportioning judicial protection is possible, but some shift toward
safeguarding local powers is indicated.
Property, Affairs and Government
Unless ambiguously interpreted, the phrase "local property, affairs and government" conveys a sufficient guide to most men in determining its contents.
The majority of subjects it encompasses can be enumerated. 55 Difficulties arise
in categories that include both state-wide necessities and local necessities. This
area of overlap has given the courts a great deal of difficulty and extensive
56
control in allocating these concurrent powers to the proper government.
Except by the development of new, heretofore unknown, local needs, it is impossible to expand the number of subjects comprising local property, affairs
and government. However, the liberal construction clause would seem to have
this effect. Under Dillon's rule, local rights and powers were narrowly construed against the local unit. Doubtful areas were decided in favor of state
power. Under the liberal construction clause, rights and powers will be con51. See, e.g., Wholesale Laundry Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 17 A.D.2d 327,
234 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1st Dep't 1962), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 998, 189 N.E.2d 623 (1962);
43 Misc. 2d 816, 252 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Matter of Kress v. City of New
York, 283 N.Y. 55, 27 N.E.2d 431 (1940); Jewish Consumptives' Relief Soc'y v. Town of
Woodburry, 256 N.Y. 619, 177 N.E. 165, affirming 230 App. Div. 228, 243 N.Y.S. 686 (2d
Dep't 1930). See also 2 McQuillin, op. cit. supra note 41, at 131-48; 39 N.Y. Jur. Municipal
Corporations § 178 (1965).
52. 2 McQuillin, op. cit. supra note 41, at 131.
53. N.Y. Const. art. IX, §§ 9, 11 (1938). See Richland, Property, Affairs And Governinent 37 (1963 Municipal Law Seminar).
54. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 2(a)(2) (1938) as amended (Supp. 1964). See Shapiro,
Powers of the Legislature 16-19 (1963 Municipal Law Seminar).
55. Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law 146-164.5 (1964); 2 McQuillin, op. cit. supra
note 41, at 154-70; Yokely, Municipal Corporations 122-127 (1956).
56. See Mendelson, Paths To Constitutional Home Rule For Municipalities, 6 Vand. L.
Rev. 66, 77 (1952); Special Legislative Committee on the Revision and Simplification of the
Constitution, The Problem of Simplification of The Constitution 90-98 (N.Y. Legis. Doc. No.
57) (1958). See generally Diamond, Some Observations On Local Government In New York
State, 8 Buffalo L. Rev. 27, 34-37 (1959).
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strued in favor of the local units. The doubtful powers should be allocated to
the local governments. The effect will be to extend those powers to the full
measure of their content. Furthermore, the limitation on local autonomy will
now be more fully understood since the phrase "local property, affairs or government" should be given its ordinary meaning. Understanding and certainty in
the meaning of the law is essential if it is to be effective. New understanding
of local limitations is now possible and should lead to more effective local
action. 57
A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR LOCAL GOVERNIENTS
A State Purpose
A second unique feature of article IX is the Bill of Rights for Local
Governments. 8 It contains a statement of the purpose of the amendment, including both effective, local self-government and cooperation between local,
governmental units. Though limited elsewhere,"9 this policy of fostering intergovernmental cooperation further indicates an intent to increase local power
to coordinate several local units by agreement.
Adoption of Local Laws
In addition to other provisions in the Bill of Rights, 0 there is a basic
limitation on local law power. Section one (a) provides, "Every local government shall have the power to adopt and amend local laws as provided by this
article." (Emphasis added.) This is the basic guarantee of the essential local
legislative power. The guarantee is not effective as to any legislative power
granted elsewhere. 6 However, since the amendment provided for a statute
of local governments and other implementing legislation, any rights or powers
given in such statutes should also be included in the guarantee of the Bill of
Rights. This indicates that the first place to look for limitations on local
power, is in the statutes granting those powers. There are inherent limitations
in the very grants of power.6 2
57. See Fleischman, Expanded Powers For Municipal Self-Government 15-17 (1964
Municipal Law Seminar); Richland, Statutory and Practical Limitations Upon New York
City's Legislative Powers, 24 Fordham L. Rev. 326, 326 & n.3, 332-34 (1955); Special Legislative Committee on the Revision and Simplification of the Constitution, op. cit. supra
note 56, 97-98.
58. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 1 (1938) as amended (Supp. 1964).
59. N.Y. Municipal Home Rule Law § 33(3) (c); N.Y. Statute of Local Government

§ 11(3).
60.
election
facilities
domain,

Section one of the new amendment (the Bill of Rights) generally provides for:
of the legislative body of local units, election of local officers, joint operation of
or services, annexation of one local unit by another, the local power of eminent
local units may profit from the operation of public utilities, apportionment of the

cost of services, and the provision of county alternative governments. See Fleischman, Grants

of Local Powers 24-25 (1963 Municipal Law Seminar).

61. Redmond, Restriction On Local Law Powers 58 (1963 Municipal Law Seminar).
62.

Id. at 58-61.
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THE ESSENTIAL HoME RULE POWERS
63
Statute of Local Governments
Another innovation provided by the amendment is the Statute of Local
Governments. In addition to granting those powers already mentioned in the
amendment, some provision had to be made for the grant of additional powers
by the legislature. The drafters sought a new form that would provide both ease
in granting powers and stability in protecting those grants from any ill-considered repeal.0 4 The new Statute of Local Governments provides both for
facility in the grant of powers by statute passed at regular session and also for
protection of those powers by placing them in the constitution. Added powers
may now be given by statute passed at a regular session, but they can be repealed only by passage of the repealer with the governor's approval in one
year and re-passage and approval of the statute in the succeeding year. This
provides local units with the opportunity to gather support and influence in
opposing any suggested repealer.
At present, the Statute contains only redeclarations of most of the powers
and rights granted in the constitution. However, there are some limitations
provided by the Statute which conflict with provisions of the constitution.
One of the most significant of these conflicts is caused by the reservation of
power by the legislature which, ".. . excludes from the scope of grants of
power to local governments in this statute ...the right and power to enact
...
(4) any law relating to a matter other than the property, affairs or government of a local government." 65 (Emphasis added.) This has the effect of
cancelling the grant of local power to enact local laws given in the amendment."" However, the Municipal Home Rule Law grants local units the power
to enact local laws in certain enumerated categories whether or not they relate
to their property, affairs or government. 67 This grant is not subject to the protection of the Statute of Local Governments and could easily be changed. The
63. This statute will take effect July 1, 1965 and is subject to amendment prior to that
time. It was enacted in 1964, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 205.
64. Fleischman, Expanded Powers For Municipal Self-Government 15 (1964 Municipal

Law Seminar);

Moore, The Constitutional Amendment 13 (1963 Municipal Law Seminar);

Fleischman, Grants of Local Powers 27 (1963 Municipal Law Seminar). See Temporary

Commission on the Revision and Simplification of the Constitution, op. cit. supra note 45,
at 20-23.
65. N.Y. Statute of Local Government § 11(4).
66. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 2(c) (1938) as amended (Supp. 1964). The amendment
provides that local units have the power to legislate in the following ten enumerated areas
whether or not they relate to their property, affairs or government: matters relating to their
officers and employees, the composition of their legislative bodies, the transaction of their business, incurring obligations, claims against local units, the care and management of their
streets and property, the acquisition of transit facilities, local authorized taxes, wages and
salaries of employees of their contractors and subcontractors and the general police power
grant. These should be compared with the grants enumerated supra at note 17, which were
provided in the amendment of 1923. Restrictions on the adoption of such local laws are provided in the Municipal Home Rule Law § 11. See Grad, op. cit. supra note 38, at 8.
67. N.Y. Municipal Home Rule Law § 10(1) (a). The enumerations in this statute
match those of the new amendment supra note 66.
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constitution's grant of local legislative power in ten enumerated areas, is the
most secure and the best indication of the extent of local power beyond the area
of property, affairs or government.68
Another exclusion from the grants of power to local units in the Statute of
Local Governments is the power to repeal or change special laws passed at the
request of a local unit or on certificate of necessity of the governor 0 9 This
is an important limitation which should cause local units to be very cautious
in requesting special legislation. If local units request special laws on subjects
as to which they themselves could legislate, they would forfeit some of that
power. They could not amend or repeal such a special law themselves and would
have to depend on another special law to repeal or amend the first. 70
Municipal Home Rule Law
Another provision of article IX states that, in addition to the Statute of
Local Governments, the legislature shall have the power, ".

.

. to confer on local

governments powers not relating to their property, affairs or government including but not limited to those of local legislation and administration. .... ,
These added powers were collected in the Municipal Home Rule Law mentioned
above. This statute bears none of the protective quality of the Statute of Local
Governments or the constitutional amendment and will probably be used more
frequently. At present, it contains significant grants and limitations.72
The constitution defines a local government as, "A county, city, town or
village." 7 3 It also provides that, ".

.

. a local government shall not have the

power to adopt local laws which impair the powers of any other local government." 74 Although the Municipal Home Rule Law defines a local government
in the exact terms of the constitution, this statute provides that, ".

.

. a local

government shall not have power to adopt local laws which impair the powers
of any other public corporation.75 (Emphasis added.) Thus a local government cannot pass a law impairing the powers of another local government,
a district corporation, or a public benefit corporation. 6 School districts, sewer
68. Redmond, Restrictions On Local Law Powers 59-63 (1963 Municipal Law Seminar).
69. N.Y. Statute of Local Governments § 11(2). Under former provisions of the constitution, local units could adopt or amend such special laws. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 12
(1938) (subsequently amended). This is especially important, since the new amendment
again permits special laws on request of the governor. Compare N.Y. Const. art. LX, § 11
(1938) (subsequently amended); N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 2(b) (2) (1938) as amended (Supp.
1964).
70. See Shapiro, Powers of the Legislature 19-20 (1963 Municipal Law Seminar).
71. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 2(b)(3) (1938) as amended (Supp. 1964).
72. See New York State Office For Local Government Analysis of the Municipal Home
Rule Law, 35C McKinney Consolidated Laws XI (Pamph. 1964).
73. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 3(d) (2) (1938) as amended (Supp. 1964). See N.Y. Municipal Home Rule Law § 2(8).
74. Id. § 2(d).
75. N.Y. Municipal Home Rule Law § 10(5). A public corporation is defined to include,
"A municipal corporation, a district corporation or a public benefit corporation as defined
in section three of the general corporation law." Id. § 2(11).
76. Ibid.
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districts and other public improvement corporations would seem to be immune
from local governmental interference. The proliferation of such special corporations can provide economical and efficient services to many local units in
combination. However, they result in a decrease of local power and control
over those services. It is possible to achieve the same economy and efficiency
in providing needed services to many local units through the use of interwhich provide some additional local control.
governmental agreements,
The definition of a local government includes counties as the recipients of
local power. This would seem to include the power to adopt and amend zoning
ordinances under the police power grant.78 However, the Statute of Local
Governments limits zoning power to cities, towns and villages.7 9 Furthermore,
the provision prohibiting local laws which impair the powers of other local
governments would also limit any county zoning power.80 A county zoning
law would certainly impair the powers of other units to zone their property.
The power to perform comprehensive planning is not limited by the Statute
of Local Governments. A county is impliedly given this power over planning
work, ". . . relating to its jurisdiction." 8' Though often sorely needed, such
comprehensive planning on a county basis would probably be prohibited or
severely limited by the impairment clause. There are possible alternatives
through the use of authorized intergovernmental agreements for county-wide
zoning, or county charter revision.
Summary
The primary sources of limitations are to be found in the grants of local
power. Where specific enumerations are made, they must be complied with
unless otherwise indicated by other provisions. All of the home rule provisions
must be read together to determine the full extent of local powers. The line
of demarcation between matters of state-wide concern and local property, affairs
or government has not been explicitly drawn but the division will now be made
in generally understood terms. Judicial hostility should be transformed into a
serious interest in effectuating the policy enunciated in article IX. There are
specific prohibitions or reservations of power to the legislature, mandatory
referenda requirements, legislative authorization requirements as well as other
traditional limits on local legislation.82
77. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 1(c). See N.Y. Statute of Local Governments § 11(5). See
generally Atkins, Municipal Co-operation (1964 Municipal Law Seminar) pp. 68-73; Hennigan, Problems of Community Growth: Water, Sewage, Refuse 141-46 (1964 Municipal
Law Seminar); Porter, A Plague of Special Districts, 1933 Nat'l Munic. Rev. 544.
78. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 2(c) (10) (1938) as amended (Supp. 1964); N.Y. Municipal
Home Rule Law § 10(1) (a) (11).
79. N.Y. Statute of Local Governments § 10(6).
80. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 2(d); N.Y. Municipal Home Rule Law § 10(5).
81. N.Y. Statute of Local Governments § 10(7).
82. See generally Alpert, Powers of Local Legislation 32 (1964 Municipal Law Seminar); Marshlow, Drafting Local Legislation 18 (1964 Municipal Law Seminar); Fleischman,
Grants of Local Powers 23 (1963 Municipal Law Seminar); Shapiro, Powers of the Legisla-
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CONCLUSION:

LOCAL RESPONSIBILITY

With the development of larger metropolitan areas and major changes in

employment, housing and recreation, the governmental function will develop
and change. To meet these expanding county-wide and area-wide necessities,
there are two basic alternatives. We may thrust the new burdens upon the state
or distribute them to both state and local governments. 83 With the increase
in problems that the state alone can manage, it would seem unwise to add to
that burden the full responsibility for problems concerning less than the whole
state.
Local government has functioned adequately considering the difficulties it
has had to overcome and the limited responsibility it has been given. To meet
the responsibility of the future, local units must be entrusted with sufficient
power. They must also be given the guidance and instruction needed to meet
previously unknown problems. Both of these requisites presuppose a favorable
atmosphere in which to develop. Through the complete "home rule package,"
local units now have sufficient power to meet the present challenge. 84 There is
also the prospect of greater power to meet future requirements. With the establishment of the state Office for Local Government, local units have a source
of guidance and instruction in meeting new problems. The favorable atmosphere
will be provided by the legislature's wise use of its restrictive and delegative
powers, by the judiciary's interest and adherence to the enunciated policy and
by the local units' willingness to accept and achieve effective local selfgovernment. Developing in this way, local governments will be ready to shoulder
most of the burdens which will arise with future change.

Thus, we appear to be on the threshold, in this State, of new developments and movements in the home rule field. If local officials will
exercise their home rule powers responsibly and effectively in the
interest of their citizens and the welfare of their communities, a good

future for home rule must inevitably develop; if, on the other hand
municipal officials

. . .

hesitate to meet the challenges of their prob-

lems through effective and full utilization of local powers, action by
and the home rule movement
the legislature will of necessity 8occur..,
5
will suffer as a consequence."1
CARMIN R. PUTRINO
ture 15 (1963 Municipal Law Seminar); Redmond, Restrictions On Local Law Powers 58
(1963 Municipal Law Seminar).
83. See generally Advisory Commission On Intergovernmental Relations, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. Report on Governmental Structure, Organization, and Planning In Metropolitan

Areas 12-59 (Comm. Print 1961); Bromage, Home Rle-N.M.L. Model, 1955 Nat'l Munic.
Rev. 132; Fordham, Home Rule-A.M.A. Model, supra at 137.
84. Recent cases have arisen under the new home rule provisions. See, e.g., McMillen
v. Browne, 14 N.Y.2d 326, 251 N.Y.S.2d 641, 200 N.E.2d 546 (1964); Klan v. County of
Suffolk, 44 Misc. 2d 351, 253 N.Y.S.2d 639 (Sup. Ct. 1964), aff'd, 22 A.D.2d 708 (1st Dep't
1964); Holcomb v. Wincuinas, 22 A.D.2d 715, 253 N.Y.S.2d 190 (3d Dep't 1964); Wholesale
Laundry Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 43 Misc. 2d 816, 252 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct.

1964).
85.

Address by Milton Alpert, Conference of Mayors in New York City, June 15, 1964.

